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Abstract- As security enhanced systems for standard e-mail,
certified e-mail schemes guarantee the fair exchange of a digital
message with the corresponding receipt between two mistrusted
parties. That is, the intended receiver gets the e-mail content if
and only if the e-mail sender obtains an irrefutable receipt issued
by the receiver, which could be used to prove that the message
has been delivered to the receiver. A number of such protocols
have been proposed in recent years. However, most of them are
not suitable for mobile networks, since many intricate crypto-
graphic primitives are involved so that considerable overheads
are introduced. In this paper, we present a novel simple protocol
for certified e-mail delivery. Technical discussions are provided
to show that our new solution is both secure and very efficient
so that it is truly suitable for wireless mobile users, where the
available devices usually have limited resources on computation,
communication, storage, and power supply.
Keywords: Certified e-mail, fair-exchange, digital signature,
wireless mobile environment, information security.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a value-added service for standard e-mail systems, a
certified e-mail scheme allows a sender Alice to deliver a
digital message to a receiver Bob over the Internet in a
fair way, i.e., either the sender Alice obtains an irrefutable
receipt from the receiver and the receiver Bob can access the
content of the e-mail simultaneously, or neither party gets the
expected item. In other words, the main purpose of certified e-
mail delivery is the fair-exchange of a message and a receipt
between two potentially mistrusted parties. This property of
fairness guarantees that a dishonest party cannot obtain his/her
expected item from a honest party in any cheating way such
that the honest party is unable to get the corresponding item.
After the completion of exchange, the sender Alice will
hold undeniable evidence of receipt (EOR). Therefore, if the
receiver Bob denies having received a specific message from
Alice, Alice can provide the publicly verifiable receipt to an
arbitrator to show that this claim is untrue. Similar security
services are provided by non-repudiation protocols [8], [15].
As practice-oriented protocols, the implementation of certi-
fied e-mail delivery usually needs the help of a trusted third
party (TTP) in the fashion of on-line or off-line. Previous
schemes [6], [16], [11 focused on the use of on-line TTP, i.e.,
the TTP is needed for every message delivering. Consequently,
those schemes are expensive and inefficient in practice, since
the TTP is supposed to offer high quality services, and the
TTP is likely to become the system bottleneck if numerous
certified emails are exchanged via the same TTP every day.
A remarkable idea is to exploit the TTP in an off-line
fashion, i.e., the TTP is involved only in abnormal situations,
where one of the two parties misbehaves or the communication
channel is out of order. That is, in normal situations the TTP is
not introduced to the protocol execution at all. Furthermore,
once the TTP is applied, it can help the victim to achieve
fair results. Therefore, we could expect that the TTP will be
involved rarely in a real system, since cheating is not beneficial
to the cheater. Based on this observation, those schemes with
off-line TTPs are called as optimistic [2]. Actually, most of
researches in this area have focused on optimistic certified e-
mail protocols [4], [9], [10], [11], [12].
However, all of the schemes mentioned above are not
suitable for wireless mobile environments due to two reasons:
efficiency and security. First of all, the wireless mobile envi-
ronments impose certain restrictions on both computation and
communication, due to the fact that mobile devices usually
have limited resources of computation, communication, stor-
age, and power supply. But those schemes are not optimized
to reduce the number of asymmetric cryptographic operations
that are required to complete a message delivery. Actually,
most of those schemes [4], [10], [8], [12] need ten or more
modular exponentiations, the most expensive operations in
cryptography. The other two schemes proposed in [9], [11]
are relatively simple, but they are vulnerable to an attack that
allows the sender to cheat the receiver by mixing identities
of different TTPs [15]. This attack is meaningful in practice
since it seems unreasonable to assume that the receiver is
aware of the existence of all TTPs and may contact each TTP
individually for help.
Actually, to our knowledge, the PRCS scheme [12] is the
unique protocol designed for users in mobile networks, but
it is both insecure and inefficient. More specifically, we can
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mount an attack that enables the sender to get a valid receipt
without delivering a message to the receiver. The reason is
that the sender could derive a partial private key from several
partial signatures, though it is supposed that this partial private
key is known only by the receiver and the TTP. In addition,
in the PRCS scheme eleven (11) asymmetric cryptographic
operations are needed to complete a message delivery.
In this paper, we present a novel simple protocol for certified
e-mail delivery suitable for wireless mobile environments.
Technical discussions are provided to show that our new
solution is both secure and very efficient so that it is truly
suitable for wireless mobile users. Compared with the existing
schemes, our protocol actually has a number of appealing
features (check Table 1 for details).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present desirable efficiency and security requirements for
certified e-mail schemes in wireless mobile networks. Then,
such a new scheme is proposed in Section III. After that,
we analyze the efficiency and security of this new protocol,
and compare it with existing solutions in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFIED E-MAIL SCHEMES
Different certified e-mail schemes may focus on different
requirements on efficiency and security. In this section, we first
set up our requirements for certified e-mail scheme suitable
for wireless mobile environments, and then argue why those
requirements are desirable in this scenario. Naturally, those
requirements should reflect the essential characteristics of both
certified e-mail and wireless mobile networks. Specifically, we
aim to present a certified e-mail schemes to satisfy all of the
following requirements.
R 1 Off-line TTP: The TTP is required to be involved in
the protocol execution only in abnormal cases, i.e., one
party is trying to cheat or the communication channel
fails to work.
R2 Transparent TTP: The generated non-repudiable re-
ceipt is the same regardless of whether the TTP is
involved or not in the protocol execution.
R3 Stateless TTP: To deal with potentially unfair situations,
the TTP is not required to maintain and search a database
that remembers the state information for each protocol
instance.
R4 Generic Construction: The receiver could exploit any
secure standard digital signature algorithm to generate
the irrefutable receipt.
R5 High Performance: To execute the protocol, both over-
heads of computation and communication should be
reduced to as low as possible.
R6 Fairness: After the completion of a protocol run, either
each party obtains the expected item or neither party
gets any useful information about the other's item.
R7 Timely Termination: Each involved party should be
able to terminate the protocol unilaterally in a given
finite time without losing fairness. This requirement is
especially important if the message being delivered is
time-sensitive.
R8 Confidentiality: Except the sender Alice and the re-
ceiver Bob, the content of the delivered message cannot
be accessed by anybody else, including the TTP.
In the above list, security-related requirements are enumer-
ated as the last three items (i.e., from R6 to R8). We believe
those are the most important security requirements for all
certified e-mail schemes [4], [91, [10]. Therefore, we retain
them as part of requirements for certified e-mail schemes in
wireless mobile networks.
Here, we want to stress that other five properties (i.e., from
RI to R5) are very meaningful for certified e-mail schemes
aimed for wireless mobile networks. First of all, the TTP's
involvement and workload are minimal if a certified e-mail
scheme supports off-line, transparent, and stateless TTP. This
implies not only that the running cost of the TTP could be
reduced accordingly, but also that the TTP's performance can
be improved considerably. Because the TTP is only involved
into the protocol execution rarely, and even in this case the
TTP only needs to perform a few simple operations. Secondly,
generic certified e-mail schemes are absolutely important since
users in the real world almost inevitably exploit different digi-
tal signature algorithms. Finally, high performance is definitely
desirable due to the resource limitations on wireless mobile
devices. That is, we should design a certified email schemes
such that both the computation and communication overheads
are as less as possible, while the essential security properties
are still satisfied.
III. THE PROPOSED CERTIFIED E-MAIL SCHEME
Like most of existing solutions, our new certified e-mail
scheme consists of an exchange protocol, a recovery protocol,
and a dispute resolution policy. The dispute resolution policy
exactly defines the receipt format and the procedures how a
judge settles the potential dispute on repudiation of receipt.
The exchange protocol is the main protocol that specifies the
procedures for the sender Alice and the receiver Bob to fellow
in normal situation. However, once the receiver Bob sent his
receipt to Alice but does not get the session key from Alice
correctly or timely, he could initiate the recovery protocol
to get the key from the TTP directly (and then derive the
message). This way assures that the sender Alice cannot cheat
the receiver Bob. Before the descriptions of those components,
we first introduce some notations and assumptions.
A. Notations and Assumnptions
In this paper, we use A, B, and T to denote unique
identifiers of a sender Alice, a receiver Bob, and a TTP,
respectively. rn is a message Alice wants to deliver to Bob.
c = Ek(m) is the ciphertext of message m encrypted with a
symmetric encryption algorithm Ek (.), where k is a session
key selected by the sender Alice. The corresponding symmet-
ric decryption algorithm is denoted by Dk(-), i.e., we have
m = Dk(Ek(m)). ET(-) denotes the TTP's secure asymmetric
encryption algorithm in the sense that the resulting ciphertexts
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can only be decrypted by the TTP using its private key. SB(j)
denotes the receiver Bob's signing algorithm, which can be
aniy secure digital signature algorithm in the sense that an
attacker cannot forge a valid signature. In addition, H(.) stands
for a cryptographic hash function such that it is infeasible
to find two inputs with the same output. Naturally, all those
algorithms are assumed to be publicly known, and all public
keys of all parties are publicly available.
As usual, the communication channel between Alice and
Bob is assumed to be unreliable, i.e., messages inserted into
such a channel may be lost. However, the TTP is linked
with Alice and Bob by reliable communication channels, i.e.,
messages inserted into such a channel will be delivered to the
recipient after a finite delay. In additon, all of those channels
are supposed to be confidential and authenticated. Actually,
this service could be provided by the SSL (Secure Sockets
Layer) or TLS (Transport layer Security) protocols.
B. Exchange Protocol
When a sender Alice wants to deliver a message m to
the receiver Bob with a guaranteed receipt, they collectively
execute the following exchange protocol.
(el1). A B: Al ,T H(kC), C? t, EKZ = ET(et k)
(e2). B A: SB ( ,EK)
(e3). A B: k
That is, Alice first chooses a session key k, and then cal-
culates the following values: ciphertext c = Ek(mn), label f =
H(A,B,T,H(c),H(k),t), encrypted key EK = ET(C,k).
After that, Alice sends message flow (el) to Bob. Note that
label f means that message m is supposed to be delivered
from the sender Alice to the receiver Bob (with/without the
help of the trusted third party T), where m is determined by a
ciphertext c and a symmetric key k such that c = Ek(m), f =
H(A, B, T, H(c), H(k), t). Here, t denotes a deadline with
the meaning that after the expiration of t, the TTP does not
accept a resolution request related to this t anymore. Therefore,
label f can be used as a unique identifier to recognize a
specific protocol instance, and link all messages generated in
this instance.
Upon receiving message flow (el), the receiver Bob first
determines whether the included deadline t is sufficient for
him to get the TTP's help (in case abnormal situations occur
later). If the answer is negative, he could simply reject this
email or require Alice re-execute the protocol by setting a
new deadline. Otherwise, Bob recovers label P, then generates
his signature SB(f,EK) and sends it to Alice as message
flow (e2). Note that in the above procedure, Bob cannot
tell whether the encrypted key EK is correctly prepared.
However, our protocol is designed to guarantee that if EK
is inconsistent with the content determined by unique label X,
Bob's signature SB (f, EK) is useless for anybody (including
the sender Alice). In such a condition, this particularly implies
that SB(f,EK) cannot be interpreted as a valid receipt.
When message flow (e2) is received, Alice checks whether
it is indeed Bob's valid signature on message (f, EK). If this
is true, Alice reveals the session key k to Bob. Finally, Bob
checks whether EK -ET(f, k). If this true, Bob could derive
the message m by decrypting cipthertext c with session key
k, i.e., m = Dk(c). However, if Bob does not get correct
k from Alice timely (due to Alice's malicious behavior or
communication failure), he can execute the recovery protocol
with the TTP (see below).
C. Recovery Protocol
Whenever before the expiration of deadline t, Bob could
initiate the following recovery protocol to get the session key
k from the TTP directly.
(rl). B - T: A,B,T,H(c),H(k),EK,t,SB(ti,EK)
(r2). T B f: ek
T - A: £,SB(C,BEK)
We now explain the above recovery protocol in detail as
follows. First, Bob sends the TTP message flow (rl) as a
recovery request. The TTP then recovers label e, checks the
validity of deadline t, and whether SB(e, EK) is Bob's valid
signature on message (e, EK). If any of the above verifications
fails, the TTP rejects Bob's application. Otherwise, it decrypts
EK with its private key. If the result is the expected pair (f, k),
i.e., the expected label P concatenated by a random number
k interpreted as a session key, the TTP forwards (f, k) and
(f,SB(f,EK)) to Bob and Alice, respectively. However, if
EK cannot be decrypted successfully or the decrypted result
is incorrect, the TTP informs Bob that this EK is invalid.
With this acknowledgement, Bob is free from taking any
responsibility on the signature SB (f, EK) signed by himself,
since this signature is actually an invalid receipt.
Remark 1. Note that in the above recovery protocol, the hash
value H(c), instead of the whole ciphertext c, is delivered to
the TTP. This approach not only reduces the communication
overhead between Bob and the TTP since c may be a huge
digital file, but also prevents the TTP from deriving the
message m from c and k. Because the TTP can just know
the session key k, but cannot get the cipertext c, which is
confidentially transferred from Alice to Bob.
D. Dispute Resolution Policy
Someday later, if the receiver Bob denies having received
message m from Alice, then the sender Alice could provide
Bob's receipt together with other relative information to show
that Bob's claim is untrue. Namely, Alice can prove that
Bob has already received message m. Specifically, Alice
could provide (A. B, T, m, k, t, SB(P, EK)) to a judge (or any
verifier). Then, the judge performs as follows:
* Compute c = Ek (m), f = H(A, B, T, H(c), H(k),t),
and EB = ET(P, k).
. Check whether SB(f,EK) is Bob's valid signature on
message (f, EK). If yes, accept Alice's claim. Otherwise,
reject Alice's claim.
Remark 2. In the above protocol description, we treat the
TTP's public encryption algorithm ET(-) as a determined
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY
algorithm. Actually, ET(.) could also be chosen as a random-
ized algorithm with randomness recoverability [15]. That is,
a random number r will be picked to encrypt message ( , k),
denoted by EK = E+(f, k); and furthermore, the TTP can
recover message (f, k) as well as randomness r from EK by
using its private key. As pointed out in [11], this is generally
true for most provably secure public key cryptosystems, such
as the OAEP series of encryption schemes [14]. Naturally,
if such a randomized algorithm is exploited, we suppose that
Alice and the TTP will reveal randomness r (together with the
session key k) to Bob in the exchange protocol and recovery
protocol, respectively. Similarly, in this case Alice is also
assumed to provide randomness r to the judge when she
requests for dispute resolution.
IV. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
Now, we argue that the proposed certified e-mail protocol
meets all the desirable requirements listed in Section II. At the
same time, we compare our protocol with other existing solu-
tions with off-line TTPs. The comparison result is summarized
in Table 1.
RI Off-line TTP. From the previous protocol specification,
it is obvious that in the normal case, i.e., both involved parties
are honest and the communication channel is in order, Alice
can get a valid receipt SB([, EK) from Bob and Bob could
access the message m by computing m = Dk(c). Namely, in
the normal situation, to deliver a message only the exchange
protocol will be executed and the TTP is not involved at all.
So, our protocol supports off-line TTP. In other words, it is
an optimistic protocol.
R2 Transparent TTP. In our protocol, the TTP's responsi-
bility is to check the validity of a recovery request. If such
a request is valid, it further decrypts EK and then sends the
session key k to the applicant. Therefore, the format of receipt
is the same regardless of whether the TTP is asked to deal with
a recovery request. That is, our protocol meets the property of
transparent TTP.
R3 Stateless ITP. In our recovery protocol, the TTP is not
required to store any information about a specific recovery
request. Actually, what the TTP needs to remember is just
its decryption private key. So, as we claimed before, in our
protocol the TTP is stateless.
R4 Generic Construction. Clearly, the proposed protocol is
generic construction, since the receiver Bob could exploit any
secure standard signature algorithm to generate his receipt
SB ( , EK). The AN scheme and PRCS scheme, however,
require a receiver to use a specific signature algorithm, i.e.,
the RSA signature [13] and the GQ signature [7], respectively.
R5 High Performance. As the main protocol, our exchange
protocol is very efficient on aspects of both computation and
communication. More specifically, in our exchange protocol,
to complete the message delivery 3 message flows are trans-
ferred between Alice and Bob. In most of existing solutions,
4 message flows are needed. On the other hand, to run our
exchange protocol, Alice and Bob need to perform 4 main
computations: (a) Encrypt and verify the encrypted session
key EK under the TTP's public key; and (b) Sign and
verify the receipt SB(f,EK). Our exchange protocol hence
requires 4 asymmetrically cryptographic operations. However,
this number representing computation cost varies from 8 to
17 in other schemes. Note that in this comparison, we do
not consider the computation cost of hash function evaluation,
symmetric encryption and decryption, since those operations
are much faster than asymmetric operations.
In fact, our protocol could become surprisingly efficient if
specific algorithms are exploited. For example, let both the
TTP and the receiver Bob have RSA cryptosystems with 1200-
bit modulus, and their public key be short exponents, e.g., 3,
17 or 625537 = 216 + 1. In this case, the sender Alice only
needs to compute less than 34 modular multiplications, while
the receiver Bob has to perform 1834 modular multiplications
on average. This setting is especially good for a mobile sender
Alice. We remark that 1834 modular multiplications are also
not a real burden for a mobile receiver Bob, since this overhead
is just equivalent to produce a standard RSA signature.
Note that in the above performance comparison, we
just compare our exchange protocol with those of existing
schemes, but do not discuss the overheads of recovery pro-
tocols. This is because recovery protocols are expected to be
run occasionally in abnormal cases, as we noticed before.
R6 Fairness. Now, we discuss the fairness, the most impor-
tant security requirement for all certified e-mail protocols. We
need to show that any of the two involved parties cannot cheat
the other in dishonest ways. Our discussion is classified into
two cases.
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Micali [ 11] Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 8 Yes* Yes Yes
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Case 1. Alice is honest, blut Bob is trving to cheat. Since
Alice is honest, the message flow (el) is correctly prepared.
So, dishonest receiver Bob has to figure out a way to get
the session key k without issuing the receipt SB(f, EK).
However, k is securely encrypted under the TTP's public key,
so Bob (maybe colluding with his conspirators other than
Alice and the TTP) cannot derive k from the EK directly.
Therefore, to get the value of k, Bob has to reveal his signature
SB (f, EK) to Bob or the TTP before the deadline t. In
this situation, Bob could drive message rn by calculating
nm - Dk(m), but Alice also gets valid receipt SB(e, EK)
from Bob or the TTP. The result is hence fair for both parties.
On the other hand, if Bob does not successfully apply for
recovery before the expiration of deadline t, this protocol run
is deemed to be cancelled. In this situation, neither Alice nor
Bob gets their expected items, so the result is still fair.
Case 2. Bob is honest, but Alice is trying to cheat. In
this case, the sender Alice may dishonestly prepare message
flow (el). For example, she could send an incorrect ciphertext
c, improperly commit H(k), and/or select a random number
for EK, etc. But the honest receiver Bob cannot find such
potential inconsistencies in message flow (el), so he will
return his signature SB (e, EK) to Alice after computing label
f = H(A,B,T,H(c),H(k),t) if t is long enough for him.
So Alice will get valid SB(f,EK) but Bob cannot access a
valid message. However, the point is that in this situation,
SB (E, EK) cannot be interpreted as a valid receipt according
to our dispute resolution policy. This means that the result
is also fair: neither party gets the expected item. Therefore,
to get a valid receipt Alice has to properly prepare and send
message flow (el) to Bob. This implies that the last chance
for Alice to cheat Bob is by refusing to reveal Bob the session
key k after getting valid SB (, EK) from Bob. However, as
we mentioned before, this noncooperation cannot harm the
receiver Bob at all, since he can get the value of k from the
TTP directly.
In contrast, the original schemes in [9], [11], [12] are actu-
ally unfair, as we reviewed in Introduction. Under the fairness
column in Table 1, we mark those schemes with "Yes*" since
they could be made fair by some proper modifications.
R7 Timely Termination. In addition, our protocol also re-
spects the property of timely termination due to the usage of
deadline t. That is, Bob could apply recovery help at any time
before the deadline, though Alice may need to wait the receipt
SB ( , EK) until the expiration of deadline t.
R8 Cotyfidentiality. In our protocol, each communication
channel between any two parties is assumed to be confidential
and authenticated. So, neither the TTP nor other outsiders
can get the ciphertext c, which is confidentially transferred to
Bob by Alice. Consequently, except the sender Alice and the
receiver Bob, anybody else (including the TTP) cannot access
the content of the delivered message m, though the TTP may
have the knowledge of the session key k (if Bob applied for
recovery). In other words, our certified e-mail protocol satisfies
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel certified e-mail scheme
suitable for wireless mobile environments, where the exploited
devices usually have limited resources on computation, com-
munication, storage, and energy supply. Technical discussions
were provided to show that our new protocol is not only secure
and but also very efficient. Compared with existing solutions,
our scheme supports a number of desirable properties simul-
taneously.
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